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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
P R U D E N T I A L F E D E R A L SAV- \
INGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, \
a corporation, Piaintif
Appellant.
and
vs.

I

FRANK H. FULLMER,, DAVID /
H . F U L L M E R and W I L L A R D f
L. F U L L M E R , JR., individually, I
and as co-partners doing business \ Case No.
under the name and style of F U L L - / 10258
M E R BROS., a co-partnership; I
W I L L I A M L. P E R E I R A , doing 1
business as W I L L I A M P E R E I R A 1
& A S S O C I A T E S ; W I L L I A M L. I
P E R E I R A & ASSOCIATES, a
corporation; and A L L E N S T E E L I
C O M P A N Y , a corporation,
/
Defendants and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF A CASE
Three purported services of summons were made
by plaintiff-appellant, Prudential Federal Savings and
1
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Loan Association, a corporation, hereinafter referred
to as Prudential or Appellant, on William L. Pereira
& Associates, a corporation, the architect for Prudential's new Salt Lake City bank building, hereinafter
referred to as Pereira or Respondent.

DISPOSITION IN T H E L O W E R COURT
The court below, after considering affidavits filed
by both parties, extensive arguments, and statements
of counsel for both parties in open court, entered its
amended judgment on October 26, 1964, quashing all
three services pursuant to Pereira's motions pertaining
to all three services.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, Pereira, seeks affirmance of the judgment of the court quashing the purported services of
summons upon it and, further, by way of cross appeal,
seeks to reverse the determination of the court below
that Respondent, Pereira, was doing business in the
State of Utah and the determination of the court that
the departure of Pereira's representative, James S.
Manning, from Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about
June 10, 1964, was motivated in part by a desire on
the part of the corporate defendant architect not to
be served in the prospective Prudential lawsuit.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has complicated this appeal and burdened
the record herein by designating numerous pleadings,
items, etc., in the file below which are in no way relative
to any of the issues on appeal, and in its purported
statement of facts makes reference to numerous unsupported allegations in its complaint and, further,
makes reference to certain alleged portions of Pereira's
architect contract which are not properly before the
court. This matter was decided in the court below upon
(1) affidavits submitted to the court by both parties
below, (2) on the extensive arguments to the court
at the time of the hearing on Respondent-Pereira's
motions to quash, and (3) by statements of counsel
made to the court during discussion of the issues involved at the time of the hearing. Appellant should
not cite certain allegations in its complaint referring,
for example, to claimed errors in design, construction
and fabrication, etc., in an apparent attempt to color
its version of the matter when, in fact, such allegations
are wholly unsupported by any evidence and had nothing
to do with the determination of the court below that
the purported service of summons in this case were
invalid.
This matter was submitted to the court, except for
statements and arguments of counsel at the time of
hearing, solely on the affidavits of the parties involved.
The court determined which affidavits it would believe
and entered its judgment accordingly and the state3
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ment of facts herein should properly be confined to those
matters. Accordingly, Respondent's statement of facts
will confine itself to those matters properly in the
record and properly before the court.
A t the outset of the hearing, counsel stipulated
(R. 10) that the corporate defendant was the only
defendant involved in this case and that all motions
to quash as to William L. Pereira, personally, be
granted.
The affidavit of William L. Pereira, Respondent's
president, commencing at R. 121, shows the following
things: Since the inception of defendant corporation
(R. 122) it has been engaged with approximately one
hundred seventy-five architectural projects, only six of
which have been out of the State of California. Two
of such out-of-state projects are those of AppellantPrudential, namely the building in Salt Lake City in
question, and another bank building of Prudential at
Butte, Montana. Another of the six out-of-state projects
was in connection with a proposal that Pereira design
a personal home for Mr. Gene Donovan, Prudential's
president, which project never materialized. A fourth
out-of-state project was a building for Brigham Young
University at Provo, Utah.
In connection with the work done out of the State
of California by Pereira, the evidence shows (R. 122)
that except for periodic visits to the site or other supervisory services, the services of Pereira are performed at
its offices in Southern California. The architectural
4
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employment in connection with the Prudential building
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was solicited by AppellantPrudential in the offices of Pereira in Los Angeles,
California, by Mr. Thomas Taylor, a senior officer of
Prudential (R. 123), who made a trip to Los Angeles
for that purpose.
The architect's agreement and the amendment
thereto involved in this case were prepared in Los
Angeles, California.
At Prudential's request (R. 123), one of Pereira's
employees, James S. Manning, was stationed at Salt
Lake City during the construction phase of Appellant's
building; the office space in which to conduct and perform the duties of Pereira was provided to Mr. Manning
without charge by Prudential. Said office was not used
for conducting any of the business of Pereira whatsoever in connection with the Prudential building at Salt
Lake City and incidentally, in connection with the
engagement of Pereira with respect to the Brigham
Young University building (R. 123). (See also Mr.
Manning's affidavit R. 31.) Except for Appellant's
request (R. 123, 124) no employee of Pereira's would
have been stationed in Salt Lake City during the construction phase of Prudential's building and no employee of Pereira's would have been stationed in the
State of Utah in connection with the Brigham Young
University building.
The Pereira affidavit further shows that its representative, Mr. James S. Manning, did not solicit or
5
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have the authority to solicit any business on behalf of
Pereira in Salt Lake City.
Finally, the affidavit shows that at the times that
the purported services of process were made upon both
Mr. Manning and Mr. Mooney neither of such persons
was the managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent or
person having the management, direction, or control
of any property of defendant corporation within the
State of Utah, nor were either of such persons in charge
of any office or any place of business of RespondentPereira within the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING
P U R P O R T E D SERVICE OF SUMMONS U P ON J A M E S S. M A N N I N G .
The facts with respect to the service of summons
on Mr. Manning are found in two affidavits, the first
at R. 29, et seq., and the second at R. 147, et seq. W e
will summarize in substance the facts as set forth in
two affidavits. As will be pointed out in more detail
later during the Argument, the affidavits filed by Prudential do not controvert the allegations of these affidavits of Mr. Manning nor in most instances even meet
the issue head-on. A careful examination of the Prudential affidavits will show that for the most part, they
neatly evade the critical statement of facts contained
in Mr. Manning's affidavits. The Prudential building
was substantially finished in May, 1964, (R. 147, et
seq.) I n the third week of May, Prudential's book6
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keeping department and personnel occupied the fourth
floor of the new building. All remaining personnel
occupied the building by the end of May, 1964. Prudential began the operation of its business in the new
building in the first week in June, 1964. All items
involving the duties of supervision on the part of the
architect were completed on or before June 11, 1964,
and Pereira's representative, Mr. Manning, had returned to Los Angeles, California. Only administrative
detail and verification of accounts and verification and
completion of certain punch list items remained to be
done after June 11, 1964, and Mr. Manning, Pereira's
representative on the job, was in California performing
other duties for Pereira which had nothing to do with
the Prudential job. Mr. Manning was in Los Angeles,
California, (R. 31, et seq.) at the time he received the
critical phone call from Mr. Joseph D. Kershisnik, the
administrative assistant to Mr. Gene Donovan, the
president of Prudential. In this phone call, Mr. Kershisnik (at the very time he was consulting with Prudential's lawyers as Mr. Kershisnik's and Mr. Staten's
affidavits will show) told Mr. Manning that a crisis
existed in Salt Lake City. That failures of the contractor gave Prudential fears that the building would
not be ready for the public opening—that the presence
of Mr. Manning was absolutely necessary and immediately required. Because of these representations, none
of which were true, Mr. Manning agreed to rearrange
his own pressing work schedule in Los Angeles and
come to Salt Lake City the following day. Mr. Ker-
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shisnik agreed that he would arrange a meeting with
the various people concerned to deal with the so-called
crisis. At 8:00 o'clock p.m. the next evening, on June
24, 1964, Mr. Manning arrived in Salt Lake City
pursuant to the urgent request and representations of
Mr. Kershisnik. At that time Mr. Manning was told
by Mr. Kershisnik that he, Kershisnik, did not feel like
working that evening and therefore the meeting had
been cancelled. Now that Mr. Manning was in Salt
Lake City, no mention was made by Mr. Kershisnik
concerning matters of a critical nature, nor did he mention anything about the urgent earlier request for Mr.
Manning to come immediately to Salt Lake City. Mr.
Kershisnik then stated that he would come to Mr.
Manning's hotel room, in the Hotel Utah, the following morning at 7:00 o'clock a.m., June 25, 1964, at
which time a pre-meeting would be had prior to the
meeting with the contractor. The next morning, June
25, 1964, Mr. Kershisnik did not arrive at 7:00 a.m.,
but did arrive at Mr. Manning's hotel room at approximately 8:15 a.m. Immediately upon entering the room,
Mr. Kershisnik stated to Mr. Manning that he had
to call his office and then made a phone call. About
fifteen minutes later a knock was heard on the door
of Mr. Manning's hotel room and Mr. Earl Staten,
Prudential's attorney, and a Deputy Sheriff entered
the hotel room and served Mr. Manning the summons
and complaint in question herein. Mr. Kershisnik then
assured Mr. Manning that he knew nothing of the
filing of the complaint or the intention to serve process

8
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that morning in the hotel room, which statements were
not true.
Mr. Manning then left the hotel and went over
to the Prudential building site in order to deal with
the so-called crisis that had induced him to come to Salt
Lake City. When they got to the job site, Mr. Kershisnik advised that the project engineer would not
even be there. An examination of the job and a discussion with one of the contractor's representatives
later that day, June 25, revealed that in truth and faci
there was no crisis and no critical matters required
the presence of Mr. Manning in Salt Lake City. Mr.
Manning was not required to nor requested to perform
any supervision or make any decision. I t was perfectly
obvious and apparent that there was no necessity whatever for Mr. Manning's presence there at that time.
Therefore, Mr. Manning left the night of June 25,
1964, and returned to Los Angeles, California. The
sole accomplishment of the trip had been the service
of summons and complaint upon Mr. Manning in the
hotel room. The very next day, Mr. Manning received
a phone call from Mr. Donovan, Prudential's president,
and during the conversation, Mr. Donovan remarked,
" I hear my people were playing cops and robbers with
you yesterday".
Later on, the last part of June, 1964, during a
dinner, Mr. Kershisnik admitted to Mr. Manning that
he had misinformed Mr. Manning in the hotel room on
the morning of the service when he, Kershisnik, had said

9
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that he had no prior knowledge of the filing of the complaint or that service was to be made on Mr. Manning.
These are the true facts surrounding the service
on Mr. Manning. As will be demonstrated under our
Argument later, they are not fairly met or denied. The
counter affidavits of Prudential are an involved, evasive, circuitous dissertation upon all sorts of happenings and do not meet the plain truth of the facts as
stated in the affidavits of Mr. Manning.
STATEMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E O F S U M M O N S ON
T H E SECRETARY OF STATE OF UTAH.
On June 30, 1964, the summons and a copy of
the complaint were served upon the Secretary of State
of Utah. Respondent-Pereira's motion to quash did go
to this summons as well as the summons on Mr. Manning and at the outset of the hearing before Judge
Ellett it was definitely stated that three service of summons were involved—that on Mr. Manning, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Mooney. I t is true that no
further evidence or discussion was had at the hearing
with respect to this service, but it was obvious to the
trial court that this service on the Secretary of State
was not authorized in any way under Utah law or
procedure. Appellant now makes a big issue about this
service, which will be met by Respondent's Argument
later herein.
10
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STATEMENT OF FACTS CONCERNING
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E O F S U M M O N S ON
GEORGE W. MOONEY.
On July 29, 1964, after Respondent-Pereira's
motions to quash had been filed and were pending before the court, Prudential caused service of summons
and complaint to be made upon George W . Mooney.
The affidavit of Mr. Mooney (R. 118 et seq.) shows
that Mr. Mooney was not and had never been an officer
or director or managing or general agent of Pereira,
nor an agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process, nor was he a managing
agent, chief clerk, or other agent or person having the
management, direction or control of any property of
Pereira within the State of Utah, nor was he in charge
of any office or any place of business of Pereira within
the State of Utah, Rule 4(e), (4). The only reason
Mr. Mooney was at the job site was that Prudential had requested Pereira's help on certain problems
that had arisen with respect to the air-conditioning
system and during these discussions, Mr. Earl Staten
and a Deputy Sheriff appeared and threw the summons
and complaint on the floor and then left.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, T H E ACTIVITIES
OF R E S P O N D E N T - P E R E I R A I N T H I S CASE
11
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DID NOT CONSTITUTE DOING BUSINESS
IN T H E STATE OF U T A H AND P E R E I R A
WAS NOT DOING BUSINESS IN
THE
STATE OF U T A H AT T H E TIME OF T H E
PURPORTED SERVICES IN
QUESTION
HEREIN.
The trial judge correctly quashed the three
purported services involved in this case. However, in
his amended judgment of October, 1964, he found in
Paragraph 1 thereof (R. 155) that at all times herein
pertinent the corporate defendant Pereira was doing
business in the State of Utah. Respondent believes that
the court was in error in this determinatoin and has
cross appealed from that erroneous determination.
We do not believe that the Respondent-Pereira
was ever at any time herein pertinent "doing business"
in the State of Utah and if we are correct in this judgment, none of the purported services of summons meet
the requirements of Rule 4(e), (4), U.R.C.P. and this
appeal can be disposed of accordingly.
The question of whether or not a foreign corporation is doing business in a given state for jurisdictional
purposes is a question of state law. I t is of no help,
as Appellant has done heretofore in this case, to cite
all kinds of decisions from other states. There are
hundreds of decisions from other states which are no
help at all in this question. W e intend to confine our
discussions on this question as to the cases that have
been decided by the Utah Supreme Court.
12
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In the case of Marchant, et al. vs. National Reserve
Company of America, et al, 137 P . 2d 331, 103 U. 530,
the court makes a comprehensive review of prior Utah
decisions and summarizes the Utah law at Page 338
of the Pacific Reporter as follows:
"To summarize, then, the law may be stated
to be, from the foregoing decisions, that to be
'doing business' in a state, a corporatoin must
be engaged in a continuing course of business,
rather than a few isolated transactions, whether
those transactions are within the usual scope of
that corporation's business or not. There must
be at least some permanence about the presence
and business transactions of the corporation within the state."
According to the decision, such things as listing
in the telephone directory, having its name on the door
of an office, the presence of a corporation officer on
personal business in the state, isolated business transactions, in and of themselves do not amount to the
doing of business. The court states at Page 337 of
the Pacific Reporter that:
"It is thus apparent that it is not any activity
of a corporation in a state other than its residence
which will justify the conclusion that it is 'doing
business' there * * * but it is the combination
of local activities conducted by such foreign
corporations—their manner, extent and character—which becomes determinative of the jurisdictional question."
This principle that a corporation must be engaged
in a continuing course of business with some permanence
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about the presence of the business activities within the
state has never been overruled.
In Western Gas Appliances, Inc. vs. Servel, Inc.,
257 P . 2d 950, 123 U. 229, the court held that a foreign
corporation which had no office in this state and limited
its activities in the State of Utah to occasional sales
trips, general promotion and supervision of business
for the purpose of promoting business in general, but
not for the purpose of consummating particular sales,
was not "doing business" in the state. The court stated
further that even the isolated transaction of installing
an air-conditioning unit and system would not create
the status of doing business in Utah.
I n Conn vs. Whitmore, 342 P . 2d 871, 9 U. 2 250,
the court held that a Utah resident who entered into
a contract by mail for the purchase of a horse in Illinois
had not done business in the State of Illinois for the
purpose of giving the Illinois court jurisdiction over
him. The court stated at Page 874 in the Pacific Reporter :
"Even under the liberalized view the foregoing
cases represent as to the prerequisites to holding
one subject to personal jurisdiction of the courts
of a foreign state, this requirement remains:
there must be some substantial activity which
correlates with a purpose to engage in a course
of business or some continuity of activity in the
state so that deeming the defendant to be present
therein is founded upon a realistic basis and is
not a mere fiction. That this is so and that a
single act or transaction does not suffice unless
it fits into the above pattern is well established."
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In the case of East Coast Discount Corporation
vs. Reynolds, 325 P . 2d 853, 7 U. 2d 362, the defense
was asserted that plaintiff corporation had failed to
qualify to do business in the State of Utah and therefore was not entitled to sue in the State of Utah. The
court held that the acts of sending guaranties to consumers in Utah upon request by the dealer, advertising
through circulars to persons whose names were submitted by the dealers, sharing one-half of the expense
of newspaper advertising, furnishing literature and
advertising to the dealer, and sending an agent into
the state when requested by the dealer to make calls
with the dealer on prospects, would not constitute doing
business. The court said that this case was not even
as strong a case for doing business as the Western Gas
Appliances vs. Servel, Inc., supra.
In the case before the court, as clearly appears
by the affidavits of Pereira (It. 121, et seq.), the contract in question for architectural services was entered
into in California; it was solicited by Appellant-Prudential at the Pereira offices in Los Angeles; all the
services of Pereira except visits and supervision at the
site were performed at its offices in Southern California. In sum and substance what occurred in this
case was the architectural designs and plans of the
Prudential building and one other building, that of
Brigham Young University, were conceived and executed in Los Angeles. The construction of two buildings in the State of Utah was not in any sense a continuity of activity or a permanent establishment of the
15
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architect's business in the State of Utah. I t seems to
us that it is no different from the case of any other
professional service rendered in the State of Utah by
out-of-state professional people. A lawyer could come
to Utah to try one or two cases; a doctor could come
to the state to perform one or two operations; a highway engineering firm could design certain sections of
the Utah interstate highway and supervise the work
here. In none of these instances is there anything
more than a casual, temporary, isolated performance
of professional services in the State of Utah and the
activities of the architect, even if they extend over a
longer period of time as in this case, do not even come
close to the "doing of business" as set forth in our Utah
cases because there is no continuity of the architect's
business, no intent or attempt at all to permanently
engage in the profession in Utah. Appellant makes
much of the fact that a resident architect was stationed
here during the construction phase of the building. I t
must be remembered that it was only as an accommodation to the Appellant and at Appellant's request.
Had it not been for this request, there would only have
been periodic site visitations as in the normal course
of performing architectural duties.
In any event, the second affidavit of Mr. Manning
(R. 147, et seq.), (see also affidavit of Betty Earl,
R. 144) shows that all phases of work requiring onsite supervision by the achitect were completed before
he ever left Utah on June 11, 1964. Appellant, by
citing numerous provisions of its complaint and alleged
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contracts in force in this case, none of which were before
the court below in connection with the hearing on this
matter, makes all kinds of conclusions and judgments
with respect to the construction of said contracts. Appellant then "rules" that the duties of the architect required
his presence in Salt L a k e City on or after J u n e 11,
1964. The affidavit of M r . Manning (R. 147) shows
the opposite to be the fact. F o r example, on P a g e 24
of its brief, Appellant makes the statement that defendant (Pereira) was contractually "bound to offer
such supervision during the entire construction period
whether or not defendant thought such supervision was
required. I t was the defendant who breached this contract by removing the fulltime supervision from Salt
L a k e City, etc." W h a t a gratuitous misstatement this
is. I n the first place, these questions of construction
of the architect's agreement were not before the court
below, but even if they had been the contract clearly
provides (R. 78) in sub-paragraph (c) of P a r a g r a p h
5 of P a g e 2 of the contract as follows:
" T h e architect and owner agree that the architect's full time supervision is necessary . . . during the construction period; and . . . a qualified
superintendent shall reside in Salt L a k e City
during the construction period."
The affidavit of M r . Manning clearly shows that
the construction period was over. Appellant, on P a g e
24 of its brief, tells this court that such supervision
was required during the ENTIRE
construction period,
meaning by this—until the last bill is paid and the final
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certificate furnished. Thus completely changing the
meaning of the contract as written and then attempt
to offer that misstatement to the court as evidence that
the architect breached his agreement.
The physical presence of Mr. Manning, Pereira's
representative, in Salt Lake City seems to be the main
basis for Appellant's claim that Pereira was doing
business in the State of Utah and if that physical presence is a crucial factor, which Respondent disputes,
then that argument itself fails because at the time
of all services of summons in question in this case,
Pereira's representative was no longer stationed in Salt
Lake City, nor was there any necessity for his presence
here.
Respondent also wishes to point out that there is
no support anywhere in this record for the court's
finding in Paragraph 2 of its amended judgment (R.
156) that "James S. Manning's departure from Salt
Lake City, Utah, on or about June 11, 1964, was motivated in part by a desire on the part of the corporate
defendant architect not to be served in the prospective
Prudential lawsuit." The second affidavit of Mr. Manning (R. 147) clearly shows the reasons for his return
to California.
For the reasons herein stated, Respondent believes
that this court should reverse the trial court's determination that Pereira was "doing business" in the State
of Utah.
18
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POINT II.
T H E J U D G M E N T QUASHING SERVICE
O F S U M M O N S ON MR. J A M E S S. M A N N I N G
IS CORRECT.
In its motion to quash (R. 27) Respondent alleged
that the purported service of summons on Mr. Manning
was obtained by fraud, trick, artifice, or deceit, or by
inveighling or enticing one James S. Manning into the
State of Utah for the purpose of attempting service
of process in this case or by taking sharp advantage
of the presence of the said James S. Manning in the
State of Utah. Respondent further * alleged in Paragraph 4 of said motion that the defendant had not
been properly served with process in this action in any
manner whatever, nor in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4(e)(4) U.R.C.P. The court in the
judgment of October 26, 1964, (R. 157) found that
the allegations of Paragraph 1 and 4 of the motion
to quash were sustained. The court further found specifically in Paragraph 6 of its amended judgment that
the purported service of summons on one James S.
Manning is void for the reason that the said James
S. Manning was induced to enter the State of Utah
by plaintiff on or about June 25, 1964, for the sole
purpose on part of plaintiff of obtaining service of
summons and complaint on the said James S. Manning.
Besides the statements and arguments of counsel made
to the court at the hearing, the court had before it on
this question the two affidavits of James S. Manning
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(R. 29, 147). Also, the affidavits of Gene Donovan
(R. 96), Joseph D. Kershisnik (R. 103), Earl P .
Staten (R. 112), and Franklin Riter (R. 129). The
two affidavits of Mr. Manning are concise, factual,
clear and short. The opposing affidavits of Mr. Donovan, Mr. Kershisnik, Mr. Staten and Mr. Riter are
long, diffuse, vague, and irrelevant, and repeatedly use,
in substance, such phrases on the part of affiant as:
" I t was affiant's understanding"; "Affiant was advised"; " I t was indicated to affiant"; and "Affiant
believes". The opposing affidavits do not squarely
meet the factual, simple allegations of the affidavits
of Mr. Manning. Instead, they attempt to set forth
a confusing narrative concerning the drafting of Prudential's complaint and other irrelevant matters. The
affidavits are full of conclusions as to the meaning of
certain contract documents, certain duties and obligations of the architect, none of which have any relevance
to the question at issue at all.
In one important particular of Appellant's affidavits
submitted to the court below there is a serious conflict
between affidavits. Prudential's various affidavits all
make reference to a conference on the morning of June
24, 1964, wherein it is claimed that the final draft of
the complaint was being worked out. The affidavits
all say in sum and substance that Mr. Joseph Kershisnik
was called into this morning meeting and that that was
the time that all the attorneys first knew of Mr. Manning's anticipated trip to Salt Lake City. In the affi-
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davit of Mr. Staten, on the eighth line of Paragraph
5 (R. 114), he states as follows:
"Mr. Kershisnik was then called into the meeting and questioned as to the exact arrival time
for Mr. Manning and he indicated that he understood Mr. Manning would be arriving on an evening plane from Los Angeles. H e stated that he
had talked to Mr. Manning T H A T MORNI N G to confirm the prospective arrival, etc."
In Mr. Kershisnik's affidavit with reference to
this very point, stated, commencing at line four, Paragraph 9 of the Kershisnik affidavit (R. 10$that:
"Later in the morning of June 24, affiant was
called into conference between Mr. Donovan
and the company's attorneys and first became
aware that a complaint had been prepared in
final form and that attempts would be made to
serve Mr. Manning while he was in Salt Lake
City. Affiant was requested to call Mr. Manning
again and verifv that he would becoming to Salt
Lake City that evening W H I C H A F F I A N T
D I D , etc."
Not only is this a direct admission by Mr. Kershisnik
that he knew that a final complaint had been drafted
and that service would be made and thereafter called
Mr. Manning and continued the inducement to come
to Salt Lake, but it also is a conflicting story as to
when the alleged phone call was made as compared
with the statement in Mr. Staten's affidavits.
After all the lengthy affidavits of Appellant have
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been read and re-read, these simple facts remain apparent and uncontradicted:
1. The construction period of the contract was
over. Supervision of the architect was no longer required on the job and he had left Salt Lake City and
returned to Los Angeles on June 11, 1964.
2. The architect's representative, Mr. Manning,
was induced to return to Salt Lake City by Prudential's
Mr. Joseph Kershisnik because an alleged situation of
great urgency and crisis required his presence.
3. As a result of these representations, Mr. Manning did return to Salt Lake City.
4. There was no crisis or urgent situation requiring
Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake City.
5. The net and only result of Mr. Manning's visit
to Salt Lake City on June 25, 1964, at the request and
inducement of Mr. Kershisnik, was the service of summons and complaint in this action.
Appellant goes to great lengths in its brief under
its Point I and cites many cases in an attempt to show
that the fine points of fraud with respect to the enticement question on Mr. Manning's service were not met
according to the cases that they cite. Respondent believes
that an analysis of the cases cited on this point by
Appellant is not necessary. The trial judge was entitled
to and did believe the affidavits of Mr. Manning. These
affidavits, as we have pointed out, are not really met
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by the counter affidavits of Appellant. The facts of the
affidavits of Mr. Manning and the minimum logical
inferences which must be drawn from them, easily meet
the most exacting requirements of the fraud and enticement cases. Be this as it may, the situation in this case
as found by the trial judge is clearly within the principles of immunity established by this court in Western
States Refining Company vs. Berry, 313 P.2d 480,
6 U. 2d 336. The court in the Berry case stated that it
was of the opinion that:
"A showing of actual fraudulent intent and
misrepresentation is not necessary in order to
void service of process in cases of this type."
Appellant attempts to limit the Berry case to settlement negotiations. W e believe that the holding of the
court goes further and that the principal of the Berry
case is, as stated in the language of the opinion:
"Equity and good conscience will not permit
plaintiff to take sharp advantage of defendant's
presence in the jurisdiction so long as defendant
is in the jurisdiction for the purpose for which
the plaintiff invited him."
The facts in this case are also well within the principals of Ultcht vs. Ultcht, 96 N . J . Eq. 583, 126 Atl.
440, cited in the Berry case. In this New Jersey case
the wife had caused a New Jersey service to be made
on the husband by taking sharp advantage of his presence in New Jersey and the court stated:
"The wife further contends that according to
her husband's own proof he was constantly pass23
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ing back and forth into this state and that therefore his privilege had been waived. I cannot
agree with this either because while it is true
as pointed out in Case vs. Smith, 152 Fed. 730,
that had he been served upon any other visit to
this state, it would have been effectual, that does
not in the slightest change the situation where
the action was taken at a time and place to which
the husband had been invited (and it makes no
difference whether expresssly or by implication)
to attend by the adverse party."
See also the citations in the Berry case to the following authorities, 42 Am. Jur., Process, Sec. 35, and 72
C J S , Process, Sec. 39.
Regardless of how this court decides the question
of whether or not the architect Pereira was "doing business" at all in the State of Utah, it is submitted that for
the reasons herein stated the quashing of service of summons upon Mr. Manning was correct.
Appellant also suggests in Point I of its brief
that since this matter was decided on affidavits by the
court below that the court can ignore this determination
and decide the matter anew on the same affidavits.
Respondent disagrees with this contention. Rule 43(e),
U.R.C.P. provides as follows:
"(e) Evidence on Motions. When a motion
is based on facts not appearing of record the
court may hear the matter on affidavits presented
by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions."
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Both Appellant — Prudential and Respondent —
Pereira appeared at the hearing on this matter in the
court below with the same persons who executed the
various affidavits submitted to the court. Both sides
were prepared to place the witnesses on the stand and
both sides contended that the matters recited in the respective affidavits were incorrect. The trial judge stated
that he did not want any oral evidence and would not
receive any and informed the parties that the matter
would be considered on affidavits and upon the arguments of counsel to the court. And this is the way the
matter proceeded. Appellant states, for example, on
Page 9 of its brief that:
" I t is highly significant that none of these
arrangements made by Mr. Manning on June
21 are in any way denied by defendant."
Respondent challenges this statement. The court below
required the parties to submit this matter on affidavits.
The court decided that it would believe the affidavits
of Respondent. Respondent stands on its affidavits and
presentation to the court below.

POINT III

THE COURT'S RULING QUASHING
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON THE SECRETARY OF STATE W A S CORRECT.
In 1961, the Legislature enacted the Utah Business
Corporation Act. This Act substantially repealed the
25
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earlier corporate enactments. I t adopted for Utah the
Model Business Corporation Act prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association. Article Four of said Act (16-10-2, etseq.) applies
to foreign corporations. The Act provides in Sec. 1610-102, Utah Code Annotated, that no foreign corporation shall have the right to transact business in this
state until it shall have procured a certificate of authority
to do so from the Secretary of State. The Act further
provides in 16-10-120, that no foreign corporation transacting business in this state without a certificate of
authority shall be permitted to maintain any action,
suit or proceeding in any court of this state until such
corporation shall have obtained a certificate of authority.*** A foreign corporation which transacts business
in this state without a certificate of authority shall be
liable to this state for the years or parts thereof during
which it transacted business in this state without a certificate of authority, in an amount equal to all fees and
taxes which would have been imposed by the laws of this
state upon such corporation had it duly applied for and
received a certificate of authority *** plus all penalties
imposed by the laws of this state for failure to pay such
fees and taxes. Appellant charges that the RespondentPereira herein violated these provisions of the Utah
Business Corporation Act. After having thus made this
determination, Appellant then seeks to impose additional sanctions other than and in addition to those
provided by the Act itself and, in effect, re-write Section 16-10-111 to provide a punishment by way of what
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Appellant terms an "estoppel." Section 16-10-111 provides that whenever a corporation authorized to transact
business in this state (this means, of course, whenever
a foreign corporation has procured a certificate of
authority from the Secretary of State) shall violate the
terms of its authorization certificate and fail to appoint
or maintain a registered agent in this state or whenever
any such agent cannot be found within the state or when
the certificate of authority is revoked, then the Secretary
of State shall be an agent of such corporation for the
service of process. Appellant, by virtue of its so-called
"estoppel" argument, would now have the court amend
16-10-111 and add in substance the following language:
"And furthermore if a foreign corporation
does business or transacts business in the State
of Utah without securing a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State and without
designating a registered agent in this state, said
corporation shall be deemed to have obtained a
certificate of authority and appointed the Secretary of State a process agent and said corporation shall be estopped to assert otherwise."
Not only would it be a perversion of the statute
itself, it would be an injustice to apply any such doctrine of estoppel against Respondent under the facts
and circumstances of this case.
Prudential's contention that the service upon the
Secretary of State is valid is based on a misconception
of the doctrine of estoppel. I t is also based upon the
presupposition that Pereira was doing business in the
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State of Utah (Appellant's brief, Page 13). This supposition is denied by Pereira and is the subject of the
cross appeal presented in Point I of this brief. If the
court finds Pereira was not doing business in the State
of Utah, then the issue of the validity of service on the
Secretary of State becomes moot. Industrial Commission vs. Kemmerer Coal Company, 150 P . 2d 373, 106
U. 476.
As pointed out in Respondent's argument in
Point I of this brief, the activities of the Respondent
architect Pereira in this case did not amount to the
"doing of business" in the State of Utah. Even if the
court should find against Pereira on this point, it would
be a clear misapplication of the accepted principles of
the doctrine of estoppel to reach the result contended
for by Appellant in its argument in its brief attempting
to overturn the ruling of the trial court with respect
to the service on the Secretary of State.
Estoppel implies that one who by his deed or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner
will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position
or attitude which thereby causes a loss or injury to the
other person. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, Sec. 1, Page 288.
Decisions by this court relative to the doctrine of
estoppel support the position that for an estoppel to
exist there must first be a representation by one party
and a subsequent reliance by the other upon that representation. The case of Kelly vs. Richards, et al, 83 P .
2d 731, 95 U. 560, says:
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"This estoppel arises when one by his acts,
representations or admissions or by his silence
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or
through culpable negligence induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies ^nd acts on such belief, so that he
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to
deny the existence of such facts." Citing 21 C. J .
p. 1113, 1114, 1115.
The Court further says:
" I t is an essential element of estoppel in pais
that the person involving it relied upon the representation or conduct of the other party, was
influenced in his own conduct by it, and would
not have acted as he did but for the acts of which
he now complains."
See also Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company, et
ah 289 P . 151, 76 U. 335; IXL Stores Company vs.
Success Markets, 97 P . 2d 577, 98 U. 124; Wellsville
Eastfield Irrigation Company vs. Lindsay Land and
Livestock Co., et al, 137 P . 2d 634, 104 U. 448.
There is nothing in the record of this case to show
either a representation on the part of Pereira or reliance
on behalf of Prudential which would invoke the application of the doctrine of estoppel. In fact, even if
Pereira had through word or action indicated to Prudential that it had secured a certificate of authority to
do business in the State of Utah, Prudential would be
hard pressed to assert reliance upon these acts when a
telephone call to the Secretary of State would have
established whether or not Pereira had secured such a
certificate.
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Wein vs. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P . 2d 222,
relied upon by Appellant in its brief deals with facts
entirely different from those of this case and is not
authority that our court has applied the principle of
estoppel in the situation similar to the one at bar.
In the Wein vs. Crockett case, appellant was an
individual who was a resident of the State of California
and who had entered into a contract with a resident
of the State of Utah. The action before the court was
a motion to quash service of summons on an agent of
appellant and the applicable statute which was being
construed by the court provided:
"Section 2. When a non-resident person is
associated in and conducts business in the State
of Utah in one or more places in his own name
or a common trade name and said businesses
are conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent, or agent, said person may
be sued on any action arising out of the conduct
of said business in his own name and a summons
in such cases may be served on said person personally or may be served upon his manager,
superintendent, or agent as the case may be as
provided in Section 104-5-11 (10)."
"Section 3. Every non-resident person doing
business as provided in the preceding section
shall file or cause to be filed a certificate under
oath with the Secretary of State of the State
of Utah setting forth the name of and place of
business of his manager, superintendent, or
agent upon whom service of summons may be
had and shall file such certificate setting forth
the name of said manager, superintendent, or
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agent on or before the 15th day of January in
each year with the Secretary of State of Utah."
The Supreme Court in holding that appellant's
failure to appoint an agent as provided in Section 3
would not constitute a defense to a service on an actual
agent as provided in Section 2 used this language:
"Plaintiff was required to designate an agent
on the effective date of the act and his failure to
comply with the law cannot be used as a reason
for defeating defendant's right to claim the benefit of the statute. Not having designated an
agent, plaintiff cannot be heard to complain if
the agent served is one designated by statute."
(Emphasis added).
I t should be noted in the Wein case the court
used the doctrine of estoppel to permit the resident
defendant to claim the benefit of the statute. It was not
used to bar a party from the right to rely upon the clear
wording of a statute as Prudential is proposing here.
With respect to the cases relied upon by Appellant
in support of its position, it should be noted that three
of the six cases, Old Wayne Life Association vs. McBonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21-22 (1907) ; Flinn vs. Western
Mutual Life Association, 171 N.W. 711, (Iowa 1919);
and North American Union vs. Oliphant, 217 S.W. 1
(Ark. 1919), involve defendants which are foreign insurance companies. I t is clear that in the area of insurance, the state has a special interest in protecting its
citizens as was recently expressed by our Legislature in
the "Title of Chapter and Purpose of Act" section of the
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Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, Title 31-35-1, Utah
Code Annotated, which was passed in the 1963 session.
I t should also be noted that four of the cases, Old Wayne
Life Association vs. McDonough, (1907) supra; Flinn
vs. Western Mutual Life Association (1919) supra;
North American Union vs. Oliphant, (1919) supra;
Yoder vs. Nu-Enamel Corporation, (1941), 300 N.W.
840; predate the Model Business Corporation Act which
did not even come into existence until 1950. (Model
Business Corporation Act Annotated, Volume 1, Preface, p. v), and it is hard to accept that they construe
statutes which are "substantially identical" to Section
16-10-111, Utah Code Annotated, as contended by Appellant.
Appellant, in contending that Pereira is estopped
to assert that it was not authorized to do business in the
State of Utah, implicitly asks the court to presume that
Pereira was qualified to do business and therefore amenable to service under the provisions of Title 16-10-111,
Utah Code Annotated. Yet Appellant in its own brief
has asserted that Pereira never obtained the certificate
of authority to do business in Utah which is the prerequisite of being authorized to do business in the state.
The following statement is found on page 13 of Appellant's brief:
"Defendant has never procured a certificate
of authority to do business in Utah as required
by Section 16-10-102 of the Utah Code. (Pereira
affidavit R. 121, Paragraph 2; Staten Affidavit
R. 117, Paragraph 12B)'\
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In the case of Lubrano vs. Imperial Counsel, O.U.S.
20 R.I. 27, 37 Atl. 345 (1897) the court was presented with a similar situation and disposed of it as
follows:
.....•;
"It will also be seen that in those cases where
judgment was rendered by default the return
on the writ showed a valid service prima facie,
and nothing was brought upon the record by the
plaintiff to contradict the same, so that the court
was fully warranted in exercising its jurisdiction;
that is to say, the court, having no knowledge
to the contrary, was bound to presume that the
defendant had discharged its statutory duty by
appointing the person therein designating as its
agent to accept service, and hence that service
upon such person was good. Here, however, no
such presumption can be said to arise, in the
face of the record before us, which shows that,
as a matter of fact, the defendant had not complied with the statute first above quoted; and
hence the court cannot stultify itself by holding
that any such presumption exists. Indeed, it
would be absurd to say that a presumption arises
as to the existence of a certain jurisdictional fact
when the court is judicially informed that it
does not exist."
In effect, Appellant is asking the court to presume
the existence of a fact which by Appellant's own admission does not exist. I t does not seem relevant to argue
that Pereira is estopped from asserting his non-compliance with the statutes when Prudential asserts the point
itself.
When the Legislature enacted the Utah Business
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Corporation Act in 1961, it had access to the threevolume work Model Business Corporation Act Annotated which was a research product of the American Bar
Foundation, the originators of the Model Business
Corporation Act. The relevant portion of Title 16-10111 is taken directly from Section 108 of the Model
Business Corporation Act which is found on page 605
of the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated,
Vol. 2 and following it is an extensive annotation on this
Section.
In reading this annotation, it is clear that the provisions of Section 108 of the Model Business Corporation Act were never intended to apply to a foreign
corporation not authorized to do business in the state.
On page 606 of this Volume, it is pointed out that several states which have adopted this section have, in
addition, added provisions dealing with a foreign corporation which transacts business without being qualified.
On page 620 of this Volume, under Comment, the following quotation is found:
" Section 108 of the Model Act provides for
the appointment of an agent by a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in the
State and for service on the Secretary of State
as agent in any case where the required agent
is not appointed or cannot be found. I t does
not limited or affect the right to serve process
upon a foreign corporation in any other manner
now or hereafter permitted by law. The effect
of Section 108 is to leave to other statutes or
to the common law the question of service of
34
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process on foreign corporations which do not
qualify to transact business in the State" (Emphasis added).
The Utah Legislature having access to this publication at the time Title 16-10-111 was enacted could
easily have added an additional provision as did Colorado, North Dakota, Wyoming and Oregon, providing
that the Secretary of State shall be deemed to be an
agent for the service of process when the corporation
transacts business without being qualified. I t did enact
such a provision with respect to unauthorized foreign
insurance companies in the 1963 session when it enacted
Title 31-35-32, Utah Code Annotated, which provides
that if a foreign insurer, not authorized to do business
in the State of Utah does engage in business in the State
of Utah, that such acts on its part shall authorize the
Insurance Commissioner to be its agent upon whom
service of process can be made.
The case of Daoud vs. Kleven, Inv. Company,
103 Atl. 2d 257, 30 N.J. S.Ct. 38 (1954), is a fairly
recent opinion dealing with a statute essentially the
same as the one at bar. In that case the New Jersey court
stated its position as follows:
"In addition to the requirement that a foreign
corporation must be present when service is
made, there is a second vital requirement, i. e.,
service must be made upon an authorized agent.
Since a corporation has no actual corporeal existence but exists only because of a legal fiction,
it is necessary to effectuate service upon an agent.
An agent may be an actual agent of such cor35
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poration, or some person so designated by statute
for the purpose of service. Service as above noted
was made upon the Secretary of State.
"There is no provision by way of statute or
rule designating the Secretary of State an agent
upon whom process may be served for a foreign
corporation which is transacting business in this
state without official authorization theretofore
had."
"N.J.S. 2A: 15-26, N.J.S.A., provides in part
as follows:
'In addition to any other method of service
duly provided, process in any action commenced
in any of the courts of this state against a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in this state may
be served upon the Secretary of State or upon
the chief clerk in his office, when * * *,
'Service upon the Secretary of State or his
chief clerk as herein provided shall be had only
as long as the circumstances authorizing such
service shall continue.'
"Patently, this is authority to serve the Secretary of State only when a foreign corporation
has been authorized to do business in the state,
and even then, only so long as additional facts
are extant."
The court concludes:
"In light of the foregoing, the service upon
the Secretary of State is deficient in two particulars which are basic and vital requirements
for legal and valid service, i. e., one, the corporation was not present in the state at the time
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of the purported service and two, service was
not had upon an authorized agent of the defendant."
See also, Winston vs. Idaho Hardwood Company,
23 Cal. App. 211, 137 P . 601 (1913) ; Equity Life Association vs. Gammon, 118 Ga. 236, 44 S.E. 987 (1903) ;
Rothrock vs. Dwelling-House Insurance Company, 161
Mass. 423, 37 N . E . 206 (1894); Vance vs. Pullman
Company, 160 F . 707 (1908) ; and Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporations, Vol. 18, Ch. 67, Sec. 8742, p. 627, et seq.
For the reasons herein stated, Respondent submits
that it is clear that the trial court's ruling quashing
service of summons on the Secretary of State is correct.

P O I N T IV

THE COURT'S RULING QUASHING
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON GEORGE W.
MOONEY W A S CORRECT.
The court below in its amended judgment of October 26, 1964, (R. 155) sustained Respondent's motion
to quash the service as to Mr. Mooney on two grounds
which are pertinent here: first, in Paragraph 4 of its
order (R. 157) the court found that the allegations of
Paragraph 3 of Respondent's motion to quash the service of summons on Mr. Mooney were sustained; second,
in Paragraph 7 of said amended judgment the court
further found that the service on Mr. Mooney was void
for the reason that the summons was issued and service
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attempted after Respondent's motion to quash the service of summons on Mr. James S. Manning was filed and
pending before the court and before the court had disposed of said motion to quash. Appellant in its brief
discusses only the second ruling of the court, namely,
that the original motion to quash was pending. The
court's ruling was correct on the basis of either or both
of the grounds stated in said amended judgment.
As to the first ground:
Respondent in Paragraph 3 of its motion to quash
the service on Mr. Mooney (R. 42) alleged that the
service on Mr. Mooney was not properly made in any
manner whatever nor in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 4(e) (4). The court sustained this allegation.
This allegation is amply supported by both the affidavits
of counsel (R. 43) and particularly by the affidavit of
George W . Mooney (R. 118). Rule 4(e) (4) sets forth
the manner in which service is accomplished upon a
corporation not otherwise provided for. The Rule requires service upon an officer, a managing or general
agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process. Or, upon any
such officer, agent, clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief
clerk, or other agent having the management or direction or control of any property of said corporation
within the state. Or, if the corporate defendant advertises or holds itself out as having an office or place of
business in this state or does business in this state, then
upon the person doing such business or in charge of such
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office or place of business. The affidavits effectively
disclose that George W. Mooney was not a person pursuant to the Rule upon whom service could be made.
At the most, he was merely in Salt Lake City en route
to Los Angeles from Butte, Montana, and at the request
of Prudential was discussing with Prudential certain
problems which Prudential contended existed with
respect to the air-conditioning equipment of the new
Prudential building. There is no showing whatever that
this was a part of the architect's contract in connection
with its work on the Prudential building. In a word,
the record is perfectly clear that Mr. Mooney was simply
not a proper person upon whom service could be made
in order to secure jurisdiction of Respondent Pereira.
See Beard vs. White, Green and Addison, Associates,
Inc., 336 P . 2d 125, 8 U. 2d 423.
The court below was also correct in its second
ground for quashing the service on Mr. Mooney.
Namely, that the service was attempted while the original motion to quash was still pending before the court
and before the court had acted thereon.
A t 72 C.J.S., Process, Sec. 21, Page 1019, the
following statement is made:
"Issuance by plaintiff or attorney. In a jurisdiction wherein a summons is issued by the plaintiff or his attorney, the issuance of one summons
does not exhaust the power (cites Washington
case) or prevent the issuance of another summons; (citing the same Washington case) but
it has been held that, without leave of court, a
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second summons cannot properly be issued by
plaintiff while a motion to quash the first summons is pending. (Citing the Colorado case of
Farris vs. Walter, 31 P . 231, 2 Colo. A.P. 450).
The court below in this case followed the Colorado
rule. Shepardization of the Farris case reveals that it
has never been overruled or modified and has been cited
many times. In this case, a suit was filed to recover on
a promissory note. The action was commenced (as is
the Utah practice) by the issuance of a summons in
substantially the same language as a summons used in
Utah at the present time.
In the Farris case defendant appeared specially
and filed a motion to quash. Thereafter, while the motion
was pending before the court, the plaintiff issued a
second summons and due return of the service of this
summons was made showing it to have been served
approximately thirty days after the first service. The
second summons was not attacked nor was any appearance made on the part of defendant in obedience to
that summons.
Thereafter, the court denied the motion to quash
on the first summons and entered judgment. The
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, saying that the
motion to quash should have been granted on the first
summons and held that judgment cannot properly have
been entered under the second summons because the
motion to quash was still pending, even though the
second summons cured the defect in the first summons.
The language of the court was as follows:
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"We are utterly unable to find satisfactory
reasons which authorize us to say that the defendant in this case was under any obligation
to appear and answer the complaint in obedience
to the second summons, while his motion to quash
was pending, and without any action or admission on the part of the plaintiff or the court
indicating the necessity therefor."
Respondent submits that the Colorado decision
is the better rule. Judge Ellett in this case felt that the
court, of necessity, must have the power and the authority to determine legal questions submitted to it without
any party unilaterally, in effect, requiring the court to
perform useless adjudications. This would be the precise
effect of permitting Appellant-Prudential to be upheld
on the Mooney service. If a party can be permitted to
serve an additional summons while a motion to quash
is pending on its first service, there is no reason why they
could not do it twice, or three, or four times, or, in fact,
have seven summones pending before all divisions of the
court on motions to quash. They could have the court at
work determining questions made moot by plaintiff's
unilateral action. I t seems to Respondent that the service of further process while the validity of the first process is already in issue before the court amounts to an
interference with the court's orderly disposition of matters before it.
In any event, Respondent submits that the Washington case cited by C.J.S. and the cases cited by Appellant in its brief are not in point with the situation at
bar. The F arris case is squarely in point with the case
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at bar and no case exists contrary to the Colorado
court's determination on this question.
Respondent submits that the quashing of the service
on Mr. Mooney should be upheld.

CONCLUSION
The activities of the Respondent architect Pereira
in this case did not constitute the "doing of business"
within the State of Utah within the meaning of the cases
heretofore cited by the Utah court. Regardless of the
court's determination tm this point, the rulings of the
trial court quashing each of the services of summons
in question herein was correct and is supported by the
record.
Respectfully submitted,
Shirley P . Jones, J r .
411 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendant and

Respondent
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